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Influenza virus outbreaks occur with regularity, but the severity of outbreaks is not consistent. The 
recent flu epidemic caused by an H1N1 swine influenza virus presents an opportunity to examine 
what is known about virulence factors and the spread of infection to better prepare for major 
influenza outbreaks in the future.The announcement on April 21, 2009 by 
the US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) regarding two patients 
in California infected with a new swine 
influenza virus (H1N1) prompted tremen-
dous media coverage and the initiation 
of pandemic flu preparedness plans by 
state and federal officials. According to 
World Health Organization guidelines, 
the current influenza outbreak is of pan-
demic proportion as it has caused “wide-
spread human infection.” In response to 
the outbreak, hundreds of schools in the 
US and elsewhere have closed, including 
nearly 2000 schools in Japan. Officials 
in Mexico, at great economic and public 
sacrifice, have closed schools and many 
commercial establishments in an effort 
to stop the spread of H1N1 infection. 
Actions such as these reflect the threat 
that influenza viruses pose as pathogens 
and the uncertainty around how a par-
ticular influenza virus strain will evolve to 
become more or less virulent.
In the 4 weeks following initial case 
reports in the US, 41 countries reported 
swine flu infections, with Mexico and the 
US bearing the majority of disease bur-
den. A total of 11,034 cases and 85 deaths 
were reported worldwide during that time 
(http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_05_21/
en/index.html). By comparison, ~80,000 
children die from malaria and more than 
twice that number die of diarrheal dis-
eases worldwide in any 4 week period 
(http://www.who.int/topics/infectious_ 
diseases/en/). On a scale of global health 
crises, the current H1N1 swine influenza 
outbreak would seem to rank low on the 
list. Why, then, has this outbreak caused 
such alarm?Fear around influenza viruses stems 
from the occurrence of three major pan-
demics over the last century. Indeed, 
influenza viruses have the potential to be 
among the deadliest of all known patho-
gens. In an average 4 week period during 
the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic caused 
by an H1N1 strain, 4,000,000 people 
died from influenza and secondary bac-
terial infections worldwide (Ahmed et 
al., 2007). This is equivalent to twice the 
number of people who died from AIDS in 
2007 worldwide. In a 4 week period, there 
were ~150,000 deaths worldwide during 
the 1957 Asian flu pandemic caused by 
an H2N2 strain, and ~80,000 deaths 
worldwide during the 1968 Hong Kong 
flu pandemic caused by an H3N2 strain. 
The history of influenza disease reveals a 
simple truth: all pandemic strains are not 
created equal.
Swine Flu at Fort Dix
The swine influenza virus outbreak of 
2009 is not the first of its kind. In 1976, 
swine virus infections were observed at 
an army training base in Fort Dix, New 
Jersey. Scientific evidence demon-
strated that the virus causing infections 
was similar to strains that had been cir-
culating in pigs for several years (Palese 
and Schulman, 1976), suggesting insuf-
ficient virulence to affect a human popu-
lation of average density. Nonetheless, 
fear of the worst prevailed. Many officials 
felt that the causative virus was related 
to the 1918 pandemic virus and that the 
time was ripe for a new human pan-
demic. What followed the Fort Dix out-
break was a major panic, resulting in the 
appropriation of $135 million to support Cell the first mass influenza virus vaccination. 
The mass vaccination program exposed 
a rare, but serious, vaccine side effect 
called Guillain-Barré syndrome, an acute 
inflammatory demyelinating disorder that 
can result in paralysis and death.
The pandemic never came, but events 
surrounding the swine flu episode 
brought to light the complete lack of 
preparedness for a disease outbreak in 
the US. In the wake of the debacle, the 
director of the CDC was replaced and 
President Ford, despite having made 
legitimate efforts to consult a variety of 
experts, was accused by some of act-
ing with excessive force to bolster his 
re-election campaign. Lessons to be 
gleaned from the 1976 episode and rec-
ommendations for assessing potential 
pandemic situations are delineated in a 
chronicle of events by Richard Neustadt 
and Harvey Fineberg (Neustadt et al., 
1978). They describe that, in 1976, decid-
ing on a course of action in the face of 
a potential swine flu pandemic was 
“like placing a bet without knowing the 
odds.”
2009 Swine Flu: A Serious 
 Pandemic Threat?
Unlike that situation in 1976, we now 
have an understanding of some specific 
markers that make a particular influ-
enza virus more or less deadly. Faced 
with a new influenza virus strain, we 
can evaluate the virus’s genome for the 
presence or absence of these markers 
in order to inform our expectations and 
preparations. The presence of a cod-
ing sequence for PB1-F2, the smallest 
protein in the influenza virus repertoire, 137, June 12, 2009 ©2009 Elsevier Inc. 983
is one molecular marker of pathogenic-
ity. PB1-F2 is not present in all human 
influenza viruses; however, it is consis-
tently present in viruses known to be of 
increased virulence in humans, including 
the viruses that caused the 1918, 1957, 
and 1968 pandemics. Laboratory studies 
have confirmed it as a virulence factor in 
mice, and some mechanisms underly-
ing its role in increased disease pathol-
ogy have been elucidated (Conenello 
et al., 2007; Zamarin et al., 2005, 2006). 
A second marker of virulence that can 
be assessed by sequences alone is 
the degree of identity between the viral 
hemagglutinin molecules of the new 
strain and those of other human viruses. 
Low identity indicates antigenically dis-
tinct hemagglutinin structures, suggest-
ing that transmission from human to 
human will not be blunted by a degree 
of “herd” immunity resulting from expo-
sure to similar viruses. A third molecular 
marker known to be relevant in the patho-
genicity of avian influenza viruses is the 
polybasic cleavage site, a protease site 
in the viral hemagglutinin that enables 
an expanded array of host proteases 
to activate the hemagglutinin molecule, 
enabling virus fusion with a host cell.
Some weeks out from the start of an 
influenza outbreak, the severity of the 
continuing situation can be assessed 
based on the following: the number of 
people who have become ill (measured 
by hospitalizations and newer monitor-
ing systems such as Google search data, 
http://www.google.org/flutrends/) and the 
apparent mortality rate associated with 
the disease. The drug resistance profile 
of clinical isolates may also be worthy of 
consideration; however, in a fast-moving 
outbreak, it is unlikely that enough people 
could be treated prophylactically for the 
rate of transmission to be affected.
So how does the 2009 H1N1 swine 
influenza virus measure up? This virus 
demonstrates requisite characteristics 
Table 1. Comparison of Avian and Swine Influenza Viruses
2009 Swine H1N1 1997 Avian H5N1 
Transmission between humans Yes No
Causes human disease Yes (mild) Yes (severe)
Degree of immunity in population Likely No
Known molecular markers of 
 pathogenicity
No PB1-F2; polybasic cleavage site in 
hemagglutinin
Figure 1. Lineage of the 2009 Swine Influenza Virus
Influenza A viruses have a segmented negative-sense RNA genome that encodes up to 11 proteins including 
the surface glycoproteins hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) and the virulence factors NS1 (host 
interferon antagonist) and PB1-F2 (proapoptotic factor). The 2009 H1N1 swine virus is a triple reassortant; it 
includes segments from swine, avian, and human influenza viruses. Figure modified from Butler (2009).984 Cell 137, June 12, 2009 ©2009 Elsevier Inc.of a pandemic strain: it can be passed 
from human to human, it is of sufficient 
virulence to cause human disease, and 
to a certain degree, humans are immu-
nologically naive to the virus such that 
exposure can result in a productive infec-
tion. Importantly, H1N1 viruses have cir-
culated consistently in the human popu-
lation since 1977 and are a component 
of annual influenza vaccines. Although 
infection of humans with this particular 
H1N1 swine influenza virus is a new event, 
prior exposure to H1N1 viruses would 
predict a degree of protective immunity 
in the human population (Table 1). The 
current circulating H1N1 swine influenza 
virus does not contain the known molec-
ular marker of pathogenicity PB1-F2, 
suggesting that it causes a mild disease 
compared to the three major pandemic 
viruses of the last century. Clinical isolates 
demonstrate resistance to the class of flu 
drugs called adamantanes (M2 inhibitors), 
but fortunately the virus remains sensitive 
to neuraminidase inhibitors such as Tami-
flu and Relenza.
The H5N1 avian influenza virus, in 
contrast, currently cannot be transmit-
ted efficiently between humans. It is sim-
ilarly resistant to adamantane flu drugs, 
but remains sensitive to neuraminidase 
inhibitors. Unlike the H1N1 swine virus, 
the H5N1 virus does contain known 
molecular markers of pathogenicity. 
Because of these molecular characteris-
tics, the phenotype of disease caused by 
the H5N1 avian influenza virus is severe, 
with many cases resulting in acute lung 
injury and death. Nonetheless, because 
very few people become infected with 
this avian virus, the relative severity of 
threat it poses in its present form is low. 
If, however, the H5N1 avian influenza 
virus adapts so that it is transmitted 
readily from human to human, it could 
result in a devastating pandemic.
We can now make a cautious assess-
ment of the relative severity of the flu out-
break caused by the 2009 H1N1 swine 
influenza virus. The number of people 
known to be infected is not growing rap-
idly, although the geographic breadth of 
cases reported is large. The mortality 
rate associated with infection appears to 
be low. Under these circumstances, the 
spread and impact of this swine influ-
enza virus are similar to those of viruses 
during an average flu season. Mutations 
enabling the expression of PB1-F2, how-
ever, could affect this status (circulat-
ing strains currently include two stop 
codons preventing expression of this 
protein). Alternatively, a reassortment 
event involving the shuffling of genes 
with other influenza viruses could lead to 
incorporation of a gene that would result 
in PB1-F2 production.
The Virus and the Swine
Influenza A viruses have segmented, 
negative-sense RNA genomes that 
encode up to 11 proteins. These include 
the surface glycoproteins hemagglutinin 
and neuraminidase and the virulence 
factors NS1 (host interferon antagonist) 
and PB1-F2 (proapoptotic factor). The 
viruses are grouped according to the 
expression of 1 of 16 hemagglutinin sub-
types and 1 of 9 neuraminidase subtypes 
(Palese and Shaw, 2007).
The elusive nature of influenza viruses 
as targets of adaptive immunity is mostly 
a function of the hemagglutinin molecule, 
the major surface antigen eliciting pro-
tective antibodies. The hemagglutinin is 
a remarkable structure, accommodating 
significant morphological changes while 
maintaining its crucial functions in attach-
ing the virus to the host cell and mediating 
fusion of the viral and host membranes.
Entry of influenza viruses into cells 
depends on the presence of a functional 
hemagglutinin molecule and expression 
of the host cell receptor for hemaggluti-
nin, sialic acid. Humans and avian spe-
cies differ in the expression of sialyl-
transferases in mucosal and respiratory 
tissues resulting in N-glycans with either 
α2,6 (human) or α2,3 (avian) linked sialic 
acids. The ability of a particular virus to 
bind to either of these two conforma-
tions of terminal sialic acid is thought to 
be the basis for the host restriction that 
is characteristic of influenza viruses. 
An avian virus that acquires the ability, 
via mutation or reassortment, to bind 
to α2,6-linked sialic acids may cross 
the species barrier and become infec-
tious in humans. Infections in swine are thought to mediate virus reassort-
ment because swine tissues express 
both forms of sialic acid, enabling cells 
to be coinfected with avian and human 
viruses (Olsen, 2002). Viruses adapted to 
swine can also combine with human and 
avian viruses to produce triple reassor-
tants that may have the ability to infect 
humans. The 2009 H1N1 swine influenza 
virus is an example of a triple reassortant 
(Figure 1).
Influenza viruses demonstrate varia-
tions in their ability to be transmitted 
between humans. Molecular markers 
predicting the ability of a virus to be 
transmitted have not yet been deter-
mined. However, low temperature and 
low humidity are known to be environ-
mental conditions that favor aerosol 
transmission, explaining the seasonal 
nature of normal influenza (Lowen et al., 
2007).
Moving Forward
Only through research can we improve 
our ability to predict which influenza 
viruses have the potential to cause seri-
ous pandemic disease. Similarly, the 
informed development of preventative 
medicines and vaccines depends on 
progress in basic research. It is criti-
cal that regulations governing our work 
on influenza viruses in the laboratory 
be rooted in prudence and reason over 
fear. Arbitrary rules serve only to limit 
the questions that can be asked at the 
bench; this translates into unrealized 
options for preventing disease.
The threat posed by atypical influ-
enza viruses in the human population is 
not new and is difficult to overstate. The 
success of research programs around 
the world, however, has contributed to a 
new degree of understanding such that, 
when faced with a new circulating virus, 
we may (cautiously) make judgments 
about the likely severity of a pandemic 
and move forward accordingly.
In all likelihood, a vaccine providing 
protective immunity to the 2009 swine 
H1N1 virus will be developed in the com-Cell ing months. Additionally, in contrast to 
1918, when secondary bacterial pneu-
monias caused the majority of deaths 
associated with influenza infection 
(Ahmed et al., 2007), we now live in an 
age of antibiotics and antiviral medica-
tions that can prevent the onset of pneu-
monia. For these reasons, and consider-
ing the molecular characteristics of the 
circulating virus, we feel confident that 
the 2009 H1N1 swine influenza virus will 
not cause a pandemic on the scale of 
those seen during the 20th century.
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